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FOR INSURANCE NULLIFICATION
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EDWARD M. JOYCE
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INTRODUCTION
n a February 1991 report, the United States General Accounting
Office found that thirteen of the top twenty property and casu-
alty insurance companies reported that they had approximately
2,000 pending lawsuits over environmental pollution claims.'
Charles Stapleton, of USF&G Corporation recently boasted that
"[a]s a property and casualty company we're in the litigation busi-
ness .... [There are] 16,000 lawsuits at any given time."2  The
interests of the insurance industry are vested in litigation, not in
insurance coverage. Policyholders, however, buy insurance because
they are adverse to lawsuits.
When an insurance company capriciously denies a claim, most
policyholders simply give up.3 Few policyholders have the finan-
cial resources to file a lawsuit seeking to force the insurance com-
* Eugene R. Anderson, Edward M. Joyce and John P. Gaisor are members
of the law firm of Anderson Kill Olick & Oshinsky, P.C. The firm regularly
represents policyholders in insurance coverage disputes.
1. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-91-59 HAZARDOUS WASTE:
POLLUTION CLAIMS EXPERIENCE OF PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURERS (1991).
2. Nicholas Varchaver, Hire Education, CORP. COUNS. MAG., Summer 1994
at 58, 63. Mr. Stapleton also said that the USF&G claims litigation group spends
$2 million annually, and that USF&G attorneys "pay for themselves in a week."
Id.
3. Gina Kolata, Patients' Lawyers Lead Insurers To Pay For Unproven
Treatments, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1994, at Al; Gavin Souter, Don't Admit Defeat
on Denial, Bus. INS., May 2, 1994, at 45.
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pany to honor its contractual obligations. This attitude is common
among policyholders despite the sentiment in the insurance industry
that in "pollution cases," almost all bases for denial of coverage has
been "destroyed."4 Insurance regulators are unable or unwilling to
help policyholders; they tell policyholders to "hire a lawyer."5
Even when a policyholder pursues the insurance company in court,
the compromises inherent in the civil justice system usually work to
the disadvantage of the policyholder. More than ninety-seven per
cent of all civil cases are settled.6 In the insurance coverage con-
text, this means that the policyholder settles and agrees to take less
than the amount to which it is entitled. This may mean that simply
by litigating insurance coverage or by litigating a claim, the system
guarantees that the insurance company will pay less than the full
value it promised when it sold the policy. In most instances, the
policyholder is not as familiar with litigation claims evaluation as is
the insurance company. The insurer is a "professional defender of
lawsuits .... Unlike the insured, an [insurance company] is not a
novice as to matters involving litigation."7 Moreover, when a poli-
cyholder is forced to litigate a claim the insurance company gains
- and the policyholder loses - the time value of money.8
When a policyholder challenges an insurance company in court
or in a regulatory proceeding,9 the odds usually favor the insurance
4. Patrick Magarick, Pollution Claims, INS. ADJUSTER, Dec. 1971, at 29, 30.
Mr. Magarick was formerly the Vice President and General Claims Manager of
the American International Group, a large insurance company.
5. See Riordan v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir.
1992); Ann Hood, I'm Insured - I Think, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 1994, at A21.
6. Eugene R. Anderson et al., Insurance Nullification By Litigation, RISK
MGMT. MAG., Apr. 1994, at 46, 48; Bert Tesoriero et al., The Draconian Late
Notice Forfeiture Rule: "Off With The Policyholders' Heads," INS. Lrr. REG.,
Apr. 1993, at 120 n.38.
7. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 7-8,
National Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1989 WL 45570 (E.D. La. Jan.
24, 1989)(No. 86-2000).
8. Tesoriero, supra note 6, at 120.
9. When an insurance company capriciously denies a claim, it can do so
without fear of regulatory reprisal. Insurance regulators rarely take effective steps
to protect the rights of individual policyholders. Anderson, supra note 6, at 46;
see John Harkavy, Protecting Buyer's Needs: State Regulators Must Give Policy
Form Changes Greater Scrutiny, BUS. INS., July 20, 1992, at 19 (stating that
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company. A policyholder can expect a major casualty loss once in
every 30 years.'0 Thus, policyholders, individually and generally,
both large and small, have minimal experience with insurance cov-
erage disputes." Moreover, policyholders buy insurance because
they are adverse to litigation. On the other side, litigation is the
bread and butter of insurance companies. 2
The current climate of increasing litigation has led to a recent
effort to solve, or at least explain the insurance coverage litigation
quandary. One such effort is the American Bar Association's Manu-
al for Complex Insurance Coverage Litigation ("Manual").3 The
Manual was created by the Section of Litigation's Task Force of
the Committee on Insurance Coverage Litigation as a definitive
reference tool for insurers and policyholders holder involved in
litigation. The case management strategies described in the Manual
are the products of this twenty member task force, which consists
of an equal number of attorneys for commercial policyholders and
their insurers, as well as one federal judge and one former state
judge. 4 The Manual serves as an authoritative set of guidelines to
be utilized by the insurers and the insureds alike for saving time
and money.
Part I of this Essay briefly discusses the Manual in the context of
the traditional and most popular form of insurance policy, the Com-
prehensive General Liability policy, a pro-policyholder form created
insurance regulators rarely act on behalf of commercial policyholders).
10. Tesoriero, supra note 6, at 120 n.38; Anderson, supra note 6, at 46.
11. National Casualty summarized the reality as follows: "It is preferable to
litigate multi-insurer coverage disputes between insurers than it is between insur-
ers and insureds, who often lack the resources to wage these disputes." Reply
Brief of Petitioner National Casualty Company at 9, National Casualty Co. v.
Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 741 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1992)(No. 91 SC
562).
12. As one insurance industry spokesman has stated, "[t]he liability system is
fuel for the insurance engine." Franklin W. Nutter, Search For Stability, Bus.
INS., July 17, 1985, at 21.
13. The Manual was produced by a sub-committee of the Task Force on
Insurance Coverage Litigation, of the American Bar Association Section of Liti-
gation. TASK FORCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION,
A.B.A. SECTION OF LITIGATION, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX INSURANCE LITIGATION
(1993) [hereinafter MANUAL].
14. MANUAL, supra note 13, at i.
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in the 1940s. Part II details key provisions of the Manual that ad-
dress the case management of "complex" insurance coverage cases,
such as environmental pollution litigation. This part also critically
analyzes the Manual provisions treating important litigation issues
such as discovery, secrecy, fiduciary duty of the insurer to the
insured, and transaction costs. This Essay concludes that the Manu-
al decidedly encourages and endorses the insurance companies to
engage in litigation, and favors the further nullification of policy-
holder insurance coverage.
I. COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY
When first introduced in 1940, the Comprehensive General Lia-
bility policy, or "CGL" policy, was hailed as a breakthrough for
policyholders. 5 Instead of having to buy several policies naming
various types of perils, a comprehensive general liability policy suf-
ficed. For example, when The Travelers Insurance Company ("The
Travelers") first sold a standard form CGL policy in the 1940s, The
Travelers executive John H. Eglof wrote an article in which he
stated:
How much better it is to say - "We cover everything except this
and this and this -" instead of "We cover only this and this and
this .... " Since a risk cannot choose the kind of accident that
will give rise to the need for liability insurance, it is wise to be
protected against all losses under one policy.., one premium and
worry regarding liability insurance. 6
Courts have specifically noted the broad scope of coverage in-
tended by CGL policies. 7 For example, in James Graham Brown
Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,8 the Kentucky
Supreme Court stated that:
15. See Jordan S. Stanzler & Charles A. Yueb, Coverage for Environmental
Cleanup Costs: History of the Word "Damages," 14 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 449,
459 (1990).
16. John H. Eglof, Comprehensive Liability Insurance: The Outside, BEST'S
FiRE & CAS. NEWS, May 1941, at 19 (emphasis in original).
17. See Marla Jo Aspinwall, Note, The Applicability of General Liability
Insurance to Hazardous Waste Disposal, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 757 (1984).
"The very title 'Comprehensive General Liability Insurance' suggests the expecta-
tion of maximum coverage." Id.
18. 814 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1991).
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The primary purpose of a comprehensive general liability policy is
to provide broad comprehensive insurance. Obviously the very
name of the policy suggests the expectation of maximum cover-
age. Consequently the comprehensive policy has been one of the
most preferred by businesses and governmental entities over the
years because that policy has provided the broadest coverage avail-
able. All risks not expressly excluded are covered, including those
not contemplated by either party. 9
An anti-policyholder bias is reflected throughout the Manual. One
example is the Manual's treatment of the CGL, one of the insur-
ance industry's most popular commercial forms.2" Section 1.07 of
the Manual suggests that, despite its name, the CGL policy does
not provide comprehensive coverage." The Manual suggests that
coverage hinges on a long list of variables including: "location,
date, conditions .... precise cause and circumstances .... affilia-
tion of individuals and instrumentalities.... manufacturing pro-
cesses, scientific principles and other technical information."22 The
insurance industry promised policyholders "comprehensive" cover-
age;23 the American Bar Association should not attempt to take it
away.
II. CASE MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEX INSURANCE COVERAGE
CASES
While no one factor differentiates complex cases from other
presumably simpler ones, many insurance cases, particularly those
with "multiple insurers or policyholders as parties," "multiple
claims or losses or one large claim or loss at issue," or "a large
number of insurance policies or other contracts with differing terms
at issue,"24 require specialized case management techniques. Dis-
19. Id. at 278.
20. MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1-14.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. In fact, prior to 1940, the insurance industry sold insurance policies that
only provided coverage for named perils. The industry then switched to "all-risk"
insurance policies that provided coverage for everything except a few items that
were expressly excluded. DONALD S. MALECKI ET AL., 1 COMMERCIAL LIABILITY
RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 238 (2d ed. 1986).
24. MANUAL, supra note 13, at xix.
1995]
60 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
covery in complex insurance coverage cases presents unique case
management and efficiency problems because the cases often entail:
"(1) a large volume of discovery requested and provided by the
parties; (2) a large number of parties seeking and responding to
discovery; (3) discovery directed to numerous non-parties having
divergent relationships with the parties and interest in the coverage
litigation; and (4) frequent discovery disputes on a broad range of
issues. 2 5 In addition to successfully resolving discovery challeng-
es, a deft case management program must also consider issues of
confidentiality, fiduciary duty, and transaction costs. The Manual
addresses these four key issues in litigation case management in a
manner that unsatisfactorily places commercial policyholders at an
unfair disadvantage.
A. Discovery
The "discovery" protocol in Chapter 3 is decidedly one-sided.
The Manual implies that by delaying the policyholder's full dis-
covery of all insurance companies, efficiency may be promoted. 6
The Manual fails to mention that the price for this alleged efficien-
cy may be that the policyholder is deprived of his legal right to
demonstrate the intent of the contract when drafted, the understand-
ing of insurance regulators when these contracts were approved for
sale, contradictory statements insurance companies have made in
courts nationwide, and the understanding of reinsurance companies.
Giving up the right to seek important insurance company docu-
ments is unquestionably injurious to policyholders. Additionally, the
withholding of these critical documents by insurance companies,
though advocated by the Manual as an "efficiency" measure,27
may even be sanctionable.28
A policyholder should be able to discover documents revealing
25. Id. at 3-5.
26. Id. at 2-34.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. American Ins. Co., No. 92-N-61, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3732, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 1993) (sanctioning Liberty Mutu-
al Insurance Company for withholding a key document, stating that "Liberty
Mutual's approach to the discovery process as a whole involves delay, obfusca-
tion, and disingenuity.") Id.
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inconsistent positions that an insurance company may have previ-
ously taken. There should be discovery of the instances in which an
insurance company has previously covered claims (a) in court;29
(b) in regulatory proceedings; 0 (c) before legislatures; (d) in rein-
surance disputes;3 (e) in its own manuals;32 and, (f) in its own
promotional literature.33
The Manual repeatedly refers to "the high cost of inefficiency"34
29. Insurance companies file "tens of thousands" of briefs against policyhold-
ers. Brief and Appendix of Amicus Curiae Insurance Environmental Litigation
Association in Support of Continental Insurance Company, Aetna Casualty &
Surety Company and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company of Newark, N.J. at 25
n.21; County of Columbia v. Continental Ins. Co., 83 N.Y.2d 618 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1994).
30. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994).
31. See North River Ins. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 831 F. Supp.
1132 (D.N.J. 1993).
32. The importance of an insurance company claims manual was underscored
in the Montrose case, in which the California Court of Appeals stated:
The Travelers Indemnity Company's amicus brief in support of Admi-
ral urges adoption of the "manifestation of loss" rule, at least in
property damage cases. We give to this brief all the weight it deserves
when it is juxtaposed with Travelers' own claim department's liability
coverage manual's explanation that, under the standard 1966 CGL
occurrence policies used by it and Admiral, the "injury must occur
during the policy period because coverage is triggered by the injury,
not the accident or the wrongful act .... When the injury is gradual,
resulting from continuous or repeated exposures, and occurs over a
period of time, coverage may be afforded under more than one policy
- the policies in effect during the period of injury."
Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 362 n.7 (Cal.
Ct. App.), vacated, 897 P.2d 1 (1995) (en banc).
33. For example, CNA Insurance Company stated in an advertisement:
Imagine being surprised in 15 years with a liability lawsuit. You just
never know if a service performed today, a product sold tomorrow, or
a material used next week may come back to haunt you in the form of
a lawsuit. Even if it takes 5, 10 or 30 years to result in a claim, your
business would be liable for the loss. That's why it's critical to choose
an insurance company now with the financial strength to pay claims
not just today, but in 20 or 30 years.
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 11, 1991, at 2 (emphasis in original).
34. Manual, supra note 13, at 2-3.
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but ignores the higher cost of depriving a policyholder of legitimate
discovery that has proven itself to be enormously persuasive to
courts nationwide. For example, regulatory history and drafting his-
tory documents are of vital importance to policyholders. Virtually
every appellate court that has considered and written about regula-
tory history, drafting history and insurance company interpretive
documents has reached a pro-policyholder decision.35 Moreover,
where the regulatory and drafting history supports insurance compa-
nies, they use it and they win.36
Another area of discovery policyholders should insist on is rein-
surance information and files.37 This information reveals what the
35. See Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 805 (7th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1646 (1993); Gerrish Corp. v. Universal Under-
writers Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 973 (1992);
New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.
1991), on remand, 778 F. Supp. 812 (D. Del. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 970
F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993); Fireguard Sprin-
kler Sys., Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1988); American
Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff d as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admi-
ral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1995); Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380
S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings
Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident
Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993); Broadwell Realty Servs. Inc. v. Fi-
delity & Cas. Co., 528 A.2d 76, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), overruled
in part by Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831
(N.J. 1993); American Star Ins. Co. v. Grice, 854 P.2d 622 (Wash. 1993); Joy
Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1992).
Appellate courts that do not discuss the regulatory history, the drafting
history, or other interpretive insurance industry documents sometimes reach anti-
policyholder results. See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597
N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987 (1993). But see Smith v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 10 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1993)(discussing drafting and regula-
tory history); ACL Tech., Inc. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 17 Cal. App.
4th 1773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Indus.
Inc., 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 1990); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476
N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1991).
36. See Oritani Sav. & Loan v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635 (3d Cir.
1993); see also Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1983); Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 751 F.2d 475 (1st Cir. 1985);
American Star Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of the West, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1320 (1991).
37. See 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1831 (1964).
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insurance companies told their reinsurance companies about the
meaning of policy terms and the policyholder's claim. In addition,
this information can help policyholders determine the terms of lost
insurance policies. Insurance companies regularly ask for and re-
ceive this type of information when it suits their purpose."8 This
information should be made available to the average policyholder
as well as to sophisticated litigants such as insurance companies.
Insurance companies should be required to disclose all possible
bases for insurance coverage. One insurance company, The Travel-
ers, has written that it was "ethically obligated to disclose potential
coverage to [the policyholder]."" This duty is glaringly omitted in
the Manual. For example, insurance companies repeatedly argue
that insurance coverage should be denied when notice is untimely
given.' Policyholders are entitled, however, to discover statements
such as the following made by one insurer: "[a]n insurance policy
is not to be construed as a game of cat and mouse, in which the
insurer (or reinsurer) can avoid liability if he succeeds in catching
his insured in a technical breach. '41
Reinsurance may be defined as a contract whereby one party, the
reinsurer, agrees to indemnify another, the reinsured .... against...
liability which the latter may sustain or incur under a separate and
original contract of insurance .... "Reinsurance" is also used to de-
note a contract between two insurers by which one assumes the risk
of the other and becomes substituted to its contract, so that on the as-
sent of the original policyholder the liability of the first insurer ceases
and that of the second is substituted.
Id.
38. See North River Ins. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 831 F. Supp.
1132 (D.N.J. 1993).
39. Memorandum of Plaintiff The Travelers Insurance Company in Opposition
to The Moving Defendants' Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatories at
49-50, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Buffalo Reinsurance Co., 735 F. Supp. 492
(S.D.N.Y. 1990)(No. 86 Civ. 3369).
40. See, e.g., Unigard Security Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 762 F. Supp.
566, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (recognizing a change in industry custom towards
insistence on close compliance with contractual notice requirements).
41. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 41, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Calvert Ins. Co., slip op. (3d Cir. 1987)(No. 86-5898). The notice provision
should only be enforced where the insurance company has been prejudiced by a
policyholder's long delay in reporting a claim. See Tesoriero, supra note 6, at
113; see also Eugene R. Anderson et al., Notice To An Insurance Company After
1995]
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Policyholders are also entitled to discover information about the
instances in which insurance companies or their affiliates have
sought and are seeking insurance coverage themselves for the same
types of claims that they are denying to their policyholders.42 In-
surance companies also buy insurance. Why should insurance com-
panies and their affiliates get coverage for certain claims while ex-
cluding the same coverage for the average businessman?
The Manual goes on to discuss how insurance policies are under-
written.43 Underwriting guidelines are crucial in reflecting the level
of risk that the insurer attaches to a policyholder. The information
that an insurer obtains in an insurance application is compared with
the underwriting guidelines to determine whether the "risk reflected
in the application is acceptable to the insurer at the specified premi-
um. '"4 If it is, then the insurer issues the policy and appropriate
endorsements. 5 The Manual suggests that insurance companies
limit discovery of the underwriting and claims documents.' It is
unfair for insurance companies to hold its policyholders to such a
high standard of disclosure, when they fail to disclose information
in return. This is an inequitable relationship with a lack of mutuali-
ty which should be changed.
Chapter 3 of the Manual seems to suggest that discovery in prior
cases should be used as a substitute to full discovery in current
insurance coverage disputes.47 This idea clearly favors insurance
companies who are in the business of litigating against policyhold-
ers and who have at least four professional trade associations to
assist them in blocking coverage.' If the insurance company can
Hecla Mining, 20 COLO. LAW. 2053, 2054 (1991).
42. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Xerox Corp., No. B-87-625, slip
op. (D. Conn. May 12, 1989).
43. MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1-11 to 1-13.
44. Id. at 1-12.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 3-10 to 3-12.
47. Id. at 3-7 to 3-10 (emphasis added).
48. Insurance industry trade associations that regularly file anti-policyholder
briefs include: Insurance Environmental Litigation Association, American Insur-
ance Association, National Association of Independent Insurers, and Alliance of
American Insurers. See Absolute Pollution Exclusion Not Applicable to Maryland
Lead Claims, 4 MEALEY's Lrr. REP., Nov. 1995, at 1 (discussing the Insurance
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simply produce documents generated in a prior litigation it can save
thousands of dollars and can hide the fact that there are thousands
more documents in its files.49 Similarly, if the insurance company
can simply produce previous depositions taken of its personnel it
not only saves money but reduces the risk its agents will make
additional damaging or contradictory statements. 50
The policyholder, who will probably encounter one major insur-
ance coverage problem in its lifetime, gains nothing by agreeing to
accept prior discovery completely in lieu of current discovery.
Obviously, the use of prior testimony to supplement current testi-
mony can save the policyholder time and money. The policyholder
should insist on both past discovery and current discovery in order
to determine if the insurance company defendants made consistent
arguments and representations. Within the past nine years a great
deal of pro-policyholder and anti-insurance company information
has become public. Courts that have reviewed this material have
issued harsh rulings against the insurance industry.5 It should
work to the policyholder's advantage that prior discovery docu-
ments may provide multiple sets of depositions and testimony of
insurance company personnel. The discovery materials in prior
cases should not be utilized to limit the policyholder's advantage,
and should be furnished to the policyholders by insurance compa-
nies.
The Manual recognizes that insurance companies regularly in-
spect their policyholder's business operations and make recommen-
Environmental Litigation Association); Alfred R. Light, Deja Vu All Over Again?
A Memoir of Superfund Past, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 29 (1995) (explain-
ing the American Insurance Association); Insurance Organizations Agree on
Principles for Superfund Reform, 7 MEALEY'S LIT. REP., Jan. 1995, at 16 (dis-
cussing the National Association of Independent Insurers); Thomas Mallin et al.,
The Suit Limitation Defense to a Party Insurance Pollution Claim: Will Insureds'
Late Discovery Arguments Succeed?, 17 N. KY. L. REv. 317 (1990) (discussing
the Alliance of American Insurers).
49. See MANUAL, supra note 13, at 3-7.
50. Id. at 3-9.
51. E.g., Morton Int'l Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831
(N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994); Adolph Coors Co. v. American
Ins. Co., No. 92-N-61, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3732 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 1993).
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dations 2 In fact, insurance companies have long touted their role
as "surrogate regulators."53 This information for "loss prevention"
or "loss control" should be furnished by the insurance companies to
the policyholder. 4 For example, in the 1960s, Liberty Mutual In-
surance Company advised its policyholders to dispose of used
cleaning solvents on open ground away from habitation.5
B. Secrecy
Secrecy of insurance company files has no place in insurance
coverage litigation.56 Such secrecy does nothing more than make it
more difficult for policyholders to litigate with insurance compa-
nies. 7 Secrecy deprives future policyholders of the benefit of the
discovery and litigation successes achieved by other policyholders.
Yet the theme of secrecy recurs throughout the Manual. For exam-
ple, the Manual, states that "[d]ue to the potential for prejudice in
subsequent cases, the parties should agree that position papers will
remain confidential and will be used only in the case for which
they were prepared."" Additionally, the Manual asserts that
"[c]ourt[s] should grant Protective Orders sought by third-parties
brought into insurance coverage litigation."59 Finally, the Manual
advocates that courts should liberally grant confidentiality orders'
52. MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1-13.
53. A group of insurance companies and anti-policyholder advocacy organiza-
tions filed an amicus brief stating that, "[o]ne function of insurance is 'surrogate
regulation.' When an insurer chooses to insure a given activity, it evaluates and
monitors the insured's performance." Brief of Amici Curiae Ins. Envtl. Litig.
Assoc. at 36, Technicon Elec. Corp. v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., slip op. (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1989) (No. 08811/85).
54. MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1-13.
55. See generally Check List for Vapor Degreasing Operations (Liberty Mutu-
al Ins. Co. Boston, N.Y.), Nov. 18, 1969 (on file with the Fordham Environmen-
tal Law Journal).
56. See generally Thomas E. Workman, Plaintiffs Right To The Claim File,
Other Claim Files And Related Information: The Ticket To The Gold Mine, 24
TORT & INS. L.J. 137 (1988).
57. See id.
58. MANUAL, supra note 13, at 2-6 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 3-38.
60. Id. at 3-43 to 3-49.
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and require that settlement agreements should be kept confiden-
tial.61
Policyholders should fight all attempts to create secrecy in litiga-
tion. Policyholders should insist that the party seeking a protective
order meet a very high burden of proof.62 At the same time, poli-
cyholders should insist that insurance shields not be turned into
swords by insurance companies seeking to use confidential policy-
holder information to paint their policyholders as wrongdoers not
entitled to protection.63
There is another corresponding problem threatening our judicial
system that the Manual ignores. Insurance companies not only in-
sist on secrecy, but when they lose an insurance coverage case they
attempt to "erase" the adverse precedent by making a settlement
with the policyholder that is contingent on the vacatur of the court
ruling.' Fifty percent of the pro-policyholder judicial decisions are
removed of legal precedential value by the insurance industry.65
This astonishing manipulation and prostitution of our judicial sys-
tem - probably our most precious heritage - has only recently
come to light.'
61. Id. at 5-17.
62. Id. at 3-49 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. R. 166(b)(5), 76(a)).
63. For example, in amicus briefs submitted to various courts, the Insurance
Environmental Litigation Association ("IELA"), a trade association of major
property and casualty insurance companies formed to present the position of its
members in environmentally-related insurance law issues, regularly labels those
who submit amicus briefs with a position in opposition to the IELA as "polluter
amici." See, e.g., Brief and Addenda of Amicus Curiae Ins. Envtl. Litig., Meagan
Lynn Oates v. The State of New York, 206 A.D.2d 979 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 21,
1993)(No. 80404). In one case, the IELA has even tagged as "polluter amici" the
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers, the Wisconsin State Public Intervenor, and
a local group called, Environmental Decade. See Brief of Amici Curiae Wis. Ins.
Alliance and Ins. Envtl. Litig. Assoc., James R. Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co.,
164 Wis. 2d 639 (Wisc. Ct. of App. 1989) (No. 89-0196, 89-0956).
64. See Philip Carrizosa, Making the Law Disappear: Appellate Lawyers Are
Learning to Exploit the Supreme Court's Willingness to Depublish Opinions,
CAL. LAW., Sept. 1989, at 65.
65. Id.
66. See Saundra Torry, When Decisions are Written in Disappearing Ink,
WASH. POST, July 25, 1994, at F7; Roger Parloff, Rigging the Common Law,
AM. LAW., Mar. 1992, at 74; Stacy Goron, Vanishing Precedents, BUS. INS., June
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Recently, in United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
Partnership,67 the Supreme Court held that vacatur is an "extraor-
dinary" remedy and that "Ujudicial precedents are presumptively
correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are
not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless
a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a
vacatur., 68 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit recently refused to vacate a banking law decision as part of a
settlement, holding that a "[vacatur] would allow a party with a
deep pocket to eliminate an unreviewable precedent it dislikes
simply by agreeing to a sufficiently lucrative settlement to obtain
its adversary's cooperation in a motion to vacate."'69 Judge
Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit, also refused to vacate
published opinions upon the parties' settlement stating that "[w]hen
a clash between genuine adversaries produces a precedent ... the
judicial system ought not to allow the social value of that prece-
dent, created at cost to the public and other litigants, to be a bar-
gaining chip in the process of settlement. The precedent, a public
act of a public official, is not the parties' property. 70
Finally, Supreme Court Justice Stevens in a dissenting opinion
also found that judicial precedents are "presumptively correct" and
allowing parties to erase them hurts society as a whole.7' Justice
Stevens criticized the viewing of precedents as merely the "property
of private litigants," and advocated that they be allowed to stand
"unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served
by a vacatur. ',7
There are other problems not addressed by the Manual. For in-
stance, insurance companies often use lawyers and law firms as
15, 1992, at 1; Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating
Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 589
(1991).
67. 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994).
68. Id. at 392.
69. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir.
1993).
70. In re Memorial Hospital, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988).
71. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp.,
114 S. Ct. 425, 431 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
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claims handlers. This practice has resulted in the protection of
normal claims handling documents under the attorney-client privi-
lege.73 Claims files are an important source of information for
policyholders that is becoming increasingly unavailable.74
C. Bad Faith
The Manual tacitly endorses two tactics commonly used by insur-
ance companies that amount to bad-faith and a breach of the in-
surance company's fiduciary duty to its policyholder. First, the
Manual suggests that policyholders should produce "all pleadings,
notices and relevant discovery from underlying claims for which
coverage is sought."75 The goal of such discovery is to enable the
insurance companies to paint the policyholder as an evil wrongdoer
undeserving of insurance.76 Insurance companies attempt to use the
allegations and documents brought to bear against the policyholder
in the underlying litigation against the policyholder in the insurance
coverage litigation at hand.77
This tactic amounts to a breach of the insurance company's fidu-
ciary obligations to policyholders and should be an act of action-
able bad faith.78 Courts nationwide have held that an insurance
company cannot place its interests in denying coverage above the
interests of its policyholder.79
73. But see National Farmers Union Prop. and Casualty Co. v. District Ct. for
the City and County of Denver, 718 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Colo. 1986) (en banc)
(holding that an insurance company "may not avail itself of the protection afford-
ed by the work product doctrine simply because it hired attorneys to perform the
factual investigation into whether the claim should be paid.").
74. But see Workman, supra note 56, at 13.
75. MANUAL, supra note 13, at 2-8.
76. See supra note 63.
77. Insurance companies regularly file briefs calling policyholders "polluters"
who are undeserving of insurance coverage. See, e.g., Reply to Plaintiff's Memo-
randum of Law In Opposition to Defendants Truck's and Fireman's Fund's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment Re: "Known Risk, Known Loss," Adolph Coors Co.
v. American Ins. Co., slip op. (D. Colo. Nov. 9, 1994)(No. 92-N-61).
78. See Adolph Coors Co. v. American Ins. Co., slip op. (D. Colo. Nov. 9,
1994)(No. 92-N-61) (awarding attorneys fees for prosecuting insurance coverage
where Liberty Mutual breached its duty to defend Coors).
79. See LaRoca v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 163, 171
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The Manual admits its silent approval of this bad-faith conten-
tion. For instance, it states that discovery about the hazardous waste
handling practices of a policyholder - sought as relevant to the
coverage issue of whether personal injury or property damage was
"neither expected nor intended" from the standpoint of the policy-
holder - could provide assistance to the underlying claimant, or
future claimants, in litigating matters against the policyholder.8"
There could hardly be a threat more chilling to a policyholder's
rights.
Continental Casualty Company has represented in judicial pro-
ceedings that "[i]f the insurer is motivated by selfish purpose or by
a desire to protect its own interests at the expense of its insured's
interest, bad faith exists."'" Equal consideration of the
policyholder's interests with those of the insurance company seems
to be the most benign formulation of the duty of good faith.
(W.D. Pa. 1971), aff d, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1973); Burnaby v. Standard Fire
Ins. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)(holding that "an insurance
company 'may not put its own interest above that of the insured's interest."'),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 884 (1994); Lieberman v. Employers Ins., 419 A.2d 417,
423 (N.J. 1980) ("[T]he insured's interests must necessarily come first."); Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 323 A.2d 495, 505 (N.J. 1974)
("[T]he relationship of the [insurance] company to its insured regarding settle-
ment is one of inherent fiduciary obligation."); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.
v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 462 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (App. Div. 1983)("[A]n insur-
er is obligated to act with undivided loyalty; it may not place its own interests
above those of its assured."), affd, 463 N.E.2d 608 (N.Y. 1984); Tank v. State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (hold-
ing it is bad faith for an insurance company to engage in "any action which
would demonstrate a greater concern for the insurer's monetary interest than for
the insured's financial risk."); WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD
FAITH LITIGATION §1.05 (1984) ("[T]he relationship between the insurer and
insured has a fiduciary character .... [B]y the inherent nature of the services to
be provided, insureds place great trust and confidence in their insurance coverage
and their insurers. In a practical sense, the insurer occupies a position comparable
to that of a trustee for the benefit of its insured. This is the very essence of a
fiduciary obligation.").
80. MANUAL, supra note 13, at 3-44.
81. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law for Trial at 13, Continental Casualty Co.
v. Great American Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Ill. 1990)(No. 86-C-3938),
quoting Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 161,
164 (Mich. 1986).
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Another bad-faith tactic endorsed tacitly by the Manual is the ex
parte interviewing of former employees of the insured, where the
interviewer fails to adequately disclose his alliance with a party to
the litigation.82 In fact, numerous courts have sanctioned or rep-
rimanded insurance company counsel for their unethical conduct in
interviewing former employees.83
Policyholders should be aware that insurance companies engage
in this conduct in an attempt to find an aggrieved former employee
who will testify that the corporation acted intentionally, thus void-
ing the insurance coverage. Policyholders should vigorously fight
the introduction of such "evidence." George Katz, one of the princi-
pal drafters of the 1966 standard form CGL insurance policy wrote
that to deny a corporation coverage on the ground that it expected
or intended injury which gave rise to the claim, the insurance com-
pany
would have to show that the level of management responsible for
making policy with regard to the act or omission causing the oc-
currence expected or intended that injury would result .... We
also intend to cover other kinds of injury resulting from intentional
acts of employees unless such acts are known to and condoned by
or directed by those officials of the corporation responsible for the
action of the employee that gave rise to the injury or damage.84
Similarly, Harold Schaffner of the Hartford Insurance Group
stated that the definition of occurrence "will not be used to deny
coverage unless the expectation or intent is that of the insured
(individual), co-partner involved (co-partnership) or responsible
82. MANUAL, supra note 13, at 3-38 to 3-39.
83. See, e.g., In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation, No. 80-C-3479, 1986
WL 1846 (N.D. 111. Jan. 28, 1986)(failure of plaintiff's attorneys to impress on
their investigators the necessity of immediately determining whether their ex
parte contacts with defendant's present employees was improper); National Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., No. 87C-SE-1 1, 1990 WL 140430 (Del. Su-
per. Ct. Sept. 10, 1990)(court imposed sanctions for improper investigator con-
duct); see also Lawrence Weiss & Adam A. Reeves, The Ex-Parte Explosion:
When Do Communications With Corporate Employees Result In Ethical Miscon-
duct?, 31 JUDGES' J. 26 (1992).
84. Letter from George Katz, Secretary, Underwriting Dept., Casualty &
Surety Div., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., to Robert F. Bauer, Assistant Secre-
tary, Johnson & Higgins (Aug. 31, 1966) (emphasis added)(on file with the
Fordham Environmental Law Journal).
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official in a management position (corporation)."85 While insur-
ance companies may conduct ex parte interviews in attempts to
gather evidence of corporate intent, courts have not deemed the
testimony of non-senior employees useful. Policyholders should
argue that the intention of a large corporation can only be deter-
mined from the acts of senior management.86
D. Transaction Costs
Everyone should strongly support measures that reduce the enor-
mous cost of insurance coverage litigation. Until 10 years ago near-
ly all insurance coverage disputes were resolved by motions for
summary judgment. What has changed since then? Not the policy-
holders and not the insurance policies. The real problem with insur-
ance coverage cases is not, for instance, the absence of proper case
management as suggested in the Manual.87 The real problem is
that the practicalities and economics of denying insurance coverage
weigh very heavily in favor of insurance companies.88 For in-
stance, insurance companies offset costs incurred through delays in
litigation through claim inflation, the increase in the value of claims
during the delay which is offset by the interest the insurance com-
pany earns.89 The policyholder, however, must cover litigation ex-
penses "out of pocket" during an insurance coverage dispute and
faces cash-flow problems, sometimes small, but more often severe.
Although prejudgment interest exists to defray expenses resulting
85. Letter from Harold Schaffner to Robert F. Bauer, Assistant Secretary,
Johnson & Higgins (Aug. 25, 1966) (emphasis added)(on file with the Fordham
Environmental Law Journal).
86. See Ashland Oil Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293, 1317
(5th Cir. 1982)(finding that knowledge by high-level officers of a waste product's
propensity to contaminate crude oil stock is evidence that the corporation "ex-
pected" or "intended" to inject hazardous wastes into a crude oil pipeline); see
also Premium Fin. Co. v. Employers Reins. Corp., 979 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.
1992); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990);
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 1994 WL 721633 (Del.
Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 1994).
87. MANUAL, supra note 13, at 2-3.
88. Id. at xix.
89. George M. McCabe & Robert C. Witt, Investment Income and Claim
Costs Inflation in Insurance, CPCU J., June 1983, at 117.
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from litigation delays, it is rarely awarded.' Thus, if a policyhold-
er pays a covered claim in year one and does not recoup the loss
from the insurance company until year four, the policyholder has
lost, and the insurance company has gained, the time-value of mon-
ey.9
1
CONCLUSION
The present litigation system promotes insurance nullification by
litigation. The Manual is evidence that not only is insurance not
working, but that the insurance industry is a strong force within the
American Bar Association. The Manual perpetuates the coverage-
defeating myth that insurance coverage disputes are so esoteric,
complicated and expensive that only the insurance industry and a
handful of big case litigation lawyers are capable of understanding
the issues.
Even if the policyholder persists in pursuing an insurance com-
pany in court, he will most likely settle the dispute. On the other
hand, just by litigating insurance coverage the insurance company is
virtually guaranteed that it will pay less than full value.
Thus, the entire litigation system - its enormous costs and
lengthy delays - works to the advantage of the insurance com-
pany. The system is structured so that the insurance company, by
denying a claim, gains the time-value of money and the likelihood
that the claim will be settled for less than its full value. Moreover,
at the same time the policyholder is fighting an uphill battle against
the insurance company's lawyers, he or she is forced to defend
endless allegations of fraud by the claims adjuster. Whether in
negotiation or in litigation, the Manual eases the burden of insur-
ance companies.
90. Home Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 729 F.2d 1132
(7th Cir. 1984).
91. Anderson, supra note 6, at 46.
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